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Abstract—Secure communication over a wiretap channel is
considered in the disadvantaged wireless environment, where
the eavesdropper channel is (possibly much) better than the
main channel. We present a method to exploit inherent vul-
nerabilities of the eavesdroppers receiver to obtain everlasting
secrecy. Based on an ephemeral cryptographic key pre-shared
between the transmitter Alice and the intended recipient Bob,
a random jamming signal is added to each symbol. Bob can
subtract the jamming signal before recording the signal, while
the eavesdropper Eve is forced to perform these non-commutative
operations in the opposite order. Thus, information-theoretic se-
crecy can be obtained, hence achieving the goal of converting the
vulnerable “cheap” cryptographic secret key bits into “valuable”
information-theoretic (i.e. everlasting) secure bits. We evaluate
the achievable secrecy rates for different settings, and show that,
even when the eavesdropper has perfect access to the output
of the transmitter (albeit through an imperfect analog-to-digital
converter), the method can still achieve a positive secrecy rate.
Next we consider a wideband system, where Alice and Bob
perform frequency hopping in addition to adding the random
jamming to the signal, and we show the utility of such an
approach even in the face of substantial eavesdropper hardware
capabilities.
Index Terms—Everlasting secrecy, secure wireless communica-
tion, A/D conversion, jamming, frequency hopping.
I. INTRODUCTION
The usual approach to provide secrecy is encryption of the
message. Such cryptographic approaches rely on the assump-
tion that the eavesdropper does not have access to the key, and
the computational capabilities of the eavesdropper are limited
[2]. However, if the eavesdropper can somehow obtain the
key in the future, or the cryptographic system is broken, the
secret message can be obtained from the recorded clean cipher
[3], which is not acceptable in many applications requiring
everlasting secrecy.
The desire for everlasting security motivates considering
information-theoretic security methods, where the eavesdrop-
per is unable to extract any information about the message
from the received signal. Wyner showed that, for a discrete
memoryless wiretap channel, if the eavesdropper’s channel is
degraded with respect to the main channel, adding randomness
to the codebook allows a positive secrecy rate to be achieved
This work has been supported by the National Science Foundation under
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[4]. This idea was extended to the more general case of a
wiretap channel with a “more noisy” or “less capable” eaves-
dropper [5]. Hence, in order to obtain a positive secrecy rate
in a one-way communication system, having an advantage for
the main channel with respect to the eavesdropper’s channel is
essential. However, in wireless systems, guaranteeing such an
advantage is not always possible, as an eavesdropper that is
close to the transmitter or with a directional antenna can obtain
a very high signal-to-noise ratio. Furthermore, the location
and channel state information of a passive eavesdropper is
usually not known to the legitimate nodes, making it difficult
to pick the secrecy rate to employ. Recently, approaches
based on the cooperative jamming scheme of [6] and [7],
which try to build an advantage for the legitimate nodes over
the eavesdropper, have been considered extensively in the
literature [8]–[13]. However, these approaches require either
multiple antennas, helper nodes, and/or fading and therefore
are not robust across all operating environments envisioned for
wireless networks. Other approaches to obtain information-
theoretic security when such an advantage does not exist
are schemes based on “public discussion” [14], which utilize
two-way communication channels and a public authenticated
channel. However, public discussion schemes result in low
secrecy rates in scenarios of interest (as discussed in detail
in [15]), and the technique proposed here can be used in
conjunction with public discussion approaches when two-way
communication is possible.
In this work, we exploit current hardware limitations of
the eavesdropper to achieve everlasting security. Prior work in
this area includes the “bounded storage model” of Cachin and
Maurer [16]. However, it is difficult to plan on memory size
limitations at the eavesdropper, since not only do memories
improve rapidly as described by the well-known Moore’s Law
[17], but they also can be stacked arbitrarily subject only to
(very) large space limitations. Our approach, first presented
in [18] and further developed in [15], rather than exploiting
limitations of the memory in the receiver back-end, exploits
the limitations of the the analog-to-digital converter (A/D) in
the receiver front-end, where the technology progresses slowly,
and unlike memory, stacking cannot be done arbitrarily due
to jitter considerations. Also, from a long-term perspective,
there is a fundamental bound on the ability to perform A/D
conversion [19], with some authors postulating that current
technology is close to that limit [20], [21]. Hence, we exploit
the receiver analog-to-digital conversion processing effect on
the received signal to obtain everlasting security. A rapid
random power modulation instance of this approach was
investigated in [15] and [18], where the transmitter Alice
modulates the signal by two vastly different power levels. The
intended recipient Bob, since he knows the key, can adapt to
the power modulation before his A/D, while the eavesdropper
Eve fails to do such and, for a restricted set of attacker
modes, information-theoretic security is obtained. However,
the power modulation scheme is susceptible to being broken
by an eavesdropper with a more sophisticated receiver than
that assumed in [15], as discussed in [15] and shown explicitly
here in Section II.
Hence, here we consider a different method to obtain ever-
lasting secrecy. First, recall that, at moderate-to-high signal-
to-noise ratios (SNRs), increasing the transmit power leads
to very small gains in the secrecy rate, as it makes the
received signal not only stronger at Bob, but also at Eve. So,
consider using excess power in a different manner. Suppose
that Alice employs her cryptographically-secure key bits to
select a jamming signal to add to the transmitted signal. Since
Bob knows the key, he can cancel the jamming signal before
his A/D; on the other hand, Eve must store the signal and
try to cancel the jamming signal from the recorded signal at
the output of her A/D after she obtains the key1. However,
the jamming signal is designed such that Eve has already lost
the information she would need to recover the secret message,
even if she obtains the key immediately after the transmission.
In particular, we present numerical results to investigate the
number of cryptographic key bits needed to obtain positive
secrecy rates and demonstrate the secrecy rates that can be
obtained in disadvantaged environments.
Next, we consider a wideband system that additionally can
employ spread-spectrum in the form of frequency hopping
to further enhance everlasting secrecy. At first glance, one
might think that the eavesdropper can easily thwart such an
enhancement by utilizing a wideband receiver that can process
all of the frequencies that the transmitter uses. However,
because of the limitations in the aperture jitter of A/Ds,
the implementation of an A/D with both a high sampling
frequency and high resolution is not feasible. Thus, Eve faces
a difficult tradeoff. If Eve employs a high resolution A/D,
she will lose any information outside her bandwidth. On the
other hand, if she employs an A/D with large bandwidth,
the resolution of her A/D will be lower, making her receiver
vulnerable to the random jamming employed by Alice, per
above.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the system model and the difficult challenges faced.
The random jamming approach for secrecy, its analysis and
numerical results for the narrowband case are presented in
1Recall that the storage of an analog signal, which is equivalent to an analog
delay line, is one of the greatest and longstanding challenges of analog signal
processing.
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Fig. 1: Wiretap channel with receiver analog-to-digital (A/D)
converters shown.
Section III. In Section IV, wideband systems are considered.
The method of Section IV is discussed in Section V. Con-
clusions and ideas for future work are presented in Section
VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. System Model
We consider a wiretap channel, which consists of a trans-
mitter, Alice, a legitimate receiver, Bob, and an eavesdropper,
Eve. The eavesdropper is assumed to be passive, i.e. it does not
attempt to actively thwart (i.e. via jamming, signal insertion)
the legitimate nodes. Thus, the location and channel state
information of the eavesdropper is assumed to be unknown to
the legitimate nodes. We consider a one-way communication
system with an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) chan-
nel between Alice and each of Bob and Eve, and we include
variations of the path-loss in the noise variance. Hence, the
signal that Bob receives is:
Yˆ = X + nB,
where X denotes the current code symbol, and nB is the
noise of Bob’s channel, nB ∼ N (0, σ2B). The signal that Eve
receives is:
Zˆ = X + nE ,
where nE ∼ N (0, σ2E) is the noise of Eve’s channel (Figure
1). We consider line-of-sight communication; however, the
scheme works similarly on fading channels with a different
calculation for the secrecy rate. We assume that X is taken
from a standard Gaussian codebook where each entry has
variance P , i.e. X ∼ N (0, P ).
The effect of the A/D on the received signal (quantization
error) is modeled by both a quantization noise, which is due to
the limitation in the size of each quantization level, and missed
symbols due to the quantizer’s overflow. The quantization
noise in this case is (approximately) uniformly distributed
[22], so we will assume it is uniformly distributed throughout
the paper. For a b-bit quantizer (2b gray levels) over the full
dynamic range [−r, r], two adjacent quantization levels are
spaced by δ = 2r/2b, and thus the quantization noise is
uniformly distributed over an interval of length δ. Throughout
this paper, the quantization noise of Bob’s A/D is denoted
by nqB , and the quantization noise of Eve’s A/D is denoted
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Fig. 2: Eve with a sophisticated receiver. To break the power
modulation approach of [15] and [18], she can record Z1 and
Z2 and decode them later - when she obtains the key, the
encryption system is broken, or she has access to an unlimited
computational power - to obtain the secret message.
by nqE . Quantizer overflow happens when the amplitude of
the received signal is greater than the quantizer’s dynamic
range. We assume that Alice knows an upper bound on Eve’s
current A/D conversion ability (without any assumption on
Eve’s future A/D conversion capabilities).
B. Power Modulation Approach [15], [18]
In the scheme of [15] and [18], a very short initial key
is either pre-shared between Alice and Bob, or they use a
standard key agreement scheme (e.g. Diffie-Hellman [23]) to
generate it. This initial key will be used to generate a very
long key-sequence by using a standard cryptographic method
such as AES in counter mode (CTR) (for more details, see
[15], [24]). We assume that Eve cannot recover the initial key
before the key renewal and during the transmission period.
However, we assume (pessimistically) that Eve is handed the
full key (and not just the initial key) as soon as transmission
is complete. Thus, the goal is to use the cheap (and numerous)
cryptographically secure bits of the key stream to obtain
“expensive” information-theoretic secret bits at the legitimate
receiver. Hence, unlike cryptographic approaches, even if the
encryption system is broken later, Eve will not have enough
information to recover the secret message.
As a first step, in [15], [18], we considered a rapid power
modulation instance of this approach, where the transmitted
signal is modulated by two vastly different power levels A1
and A2 at the transmitter. Since Bob knows the key, he can
undo the effect of the power modulation before his A/D,
putting his signal in the appropriate range for analog-to-
digital conversion, while Eve must compromise between larger
quantization noise and more A/D overflows. Consequently,
she will lose information she needs to recover the message,
and information-theoretic security is obtained. However, a
clear risk of the approach of [15], [18] is a sophisticated
eavesdropper with multiple A/Ds. Suppose that Eve has two
A/Ds, and she uses them in parallel with a gain in front of
each A/D such that each gain cancels the effect of one of
the gains that Alice uses to modulate the secret message;
thus, she records Z1 and Z2 as shown in Figure 2. After
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Fig. 3: Bob and Eve both receive the superposition of the
message and the random jamming signal. Bob uses the key
sequence to cancel the effect of the jammer on his signal
before the analog-to-digital conversion, while Eve has to wait
to obtain the key after completion of transmission and cancel
the effect of the jammer after her A/D.
completion of the transmission, if Eve obtains the key as we
assume, she can use it to retain for each channel use only the
element of {Z1, Z2} from the branch of her receiver prop-
erly matched to the transmission gain. In the disadvantaged
wireless scenario, Eve’s recorded signal then contains more
information than Bob’s about the transmitted message from
Alice, and thus the desired everlasting secrecy is compromised.
In the next section, a new approach to utilize the key bits to
obtain everlasting secrecy in the case of an eavesdropper with
sophisticated hardware is presented.
III. RANDOM JAMMING FOR SECRECY
In this paper, we propose adding random jamming with
large variation to the signal to obtain secrecy (Figure 3).
Suppose that Alice employs her cryptographically-secure key
bits to select a signal from a uniform discrete distribution to
add to the transmitted signal. Now, since Bob knows the key,
he can simply subtract off the jamming signal and continue
normal decoding with an A/D converter well-matched to the
span of the signal. However, Eve does not have knowledge
of the key and thus has difficulty matching the span of her
A/D to the received signal. If she does not change the span of
her A/D, she will lose information due to overflows. On the
other hand, if she increases the span of her A/D to contain
all of the received signal, the width of each quantization
level will increase and thus she will lose information due to
higher quantization noise. As before, we assume that the key
is handed to Eve as soon as transmission is complete, and
obviously Eve could simply subtract the jamming signal off of
her recorded samples in memory. But, as before, a nonlinear
operation (the analog-to-digital converter) has processed the
signal, hence allowing the possibility of information-theoretic
secrecy even when the secret key is handed to Eve immediately
Fig. 4: I(X ;Z) versus k (the number of key bits per jamming
symbol) and m (the span of Eve’s A/D) when Eve has a be =
20 bit A/D. Observe that the mutual information is maximized
when m = k (the red dashed line). Thus, Eve will set the span
of her A/D to 2k+1lσ.
after the transmission.2 Indeed, with her poorly matched A/D,
Eve will not have recorded a reasonable version of the signal
and we will see that information-theoretic security can be
obtained. In this case, one countermeasure for Eve would be to
employ parallel receiver branches, each with a different fixed
voltage offset; however, this is precisely a higher-resolution
A/D over a larger span and thus is captured by the standard
A/D model and technology trend lines. In this paper, we will
show that, through such a scheme, “cheap” cryptographically-
secure key bits can be used to greatly increase the transmission
rate of the desired “expensive” information-theoretic secure
bits.
A. Analysis
Suppose that Eve has a be bit A/D and she sets the span of
the A/D to 2lσ to cover [−lσ, lσ], where l is a constant that
maximizes I(X ;Z), and σ =
√
P is the standard deviation
of the transmitted signal X . Now, suppose that Alice adds a
random jamming signal J to X based on the pre-shared key
between Alice and Bob (Figure 3). In particular, J follows a
discrete uniform distribution with 2k levels between −c and
c, where k is the number of key bits per jamming symbol,
and c (maximum amplitude of the jamming signal) is an
arbitrary constant. In order to maximize the degradation of
Eve’s A/D, Alice should maximize c. Thus, given that k key
bits per jamming symbol is available at Alice, the relationship
between k and c is: (2k − 1)× 2lσ = 2c. On the other hand,
Eve, in order to maximize I(X ;Z), expands the span of her
A/D to 2nlσ, where n = 2m is an arbitrary constant that
maximizes I(X ;Z). Hence, the new resolution of Eve’s A/D
will be δ′e = 2lσn2be =
2lσ
2be−m , and, since the jamming signal
is uniformly distributed, she will miss a fraction 2
k−2m
2k
of
the information due to her A/D overflows. In the numerical
2We put the previous phrase in italics so that the reader does not confuse
the proposed approach with a number of schemes in the information-theoretic
secrecy literature that look similar, but must presume that the key (or secret)
on which the jamming sequence is based is kept secret from Eve forever.
results, we will show that the best strategy for Eve to employ
to maximize her mutual information is to set the span of her
A/D to [−c− lσ, c+ lσ], or equivalently m = k. Hence, in the
remainder of this section, we assume the dynamic range of
Eve’s A/D is 2k+1lσ, and thus no A/D overflow happens. In
order to calculate the achievable secrecy rates, I(X ;Y ) and
I(X ;Z) are needed. We only show the calculations for the
latter here, as I(X ;Y ) can be obtained in a similar way. The
mutual information between X and Z can be written as,
I(X ;Z) = h(Z)− h(Z|X)
=
∫ lσ
−lσ
−fZ(z) log(fZ(z))dz
−
∫ ∞
−∞
fX(x)
∫ lσ
−lσ
−fZ|X=x(z) log(fZ|X=x(z))dzdx, (1)
Hence, we need to calculate the probability density functions
(pdf) of Z and Z|X = x. The signal at the input of Eve’s
receiver is Zˆ = J + X + nE . Suppose that after analog-to-
digital conversion, Eve can somehow obtain the key and cancel
the effect of the jamming signal. Hence, the eventual signal
that Eve obtains is: Z = X + nE + nqE . For simplicity of
presentation, we define the random variable Z ′ as Z ′ = X +
nE . Since X ∼ N (0, P ) and ne ∼ N (0, σ2e), Z ′ follows
a normal distribution with zero mean and variance P + σ2E .
Hence, the probability density function of Z is,
fZ(z) = fZ′(z) ∗ fnqE (z)
=
1
δ′E
∫ lσ
−lσ
fZ′(s)U[−δ′
E
/2,δ′
E
/2](z − s)ds
=
1
δ′E
∫ min(lσ,z+δ′E/2)
max(−lσ,z−δ′
E
/2)
fZ′(s)ds
=
1
δ′E
[
Q
(
max(−lσ, z − δ′E/2)√
P + σ2E
)
−Q
(
min(lσ, z + δ′E/2)√
P + σ2E
)]
,
(2)
where U[a,b](.) is the rectangle function on [a, b], i.e. the value
of the function is 1 on the interval [a, b] and is zero elsewhere.
The random variable Z ′ given X = x has a Gaussian dis-
tribution with mean x and variance σE . Thus, the probability
density function of Z|X = x is,
fZ|X=x(z) = fZ′|X=x(z) ∗ fnqE (z)
=
1
δ′E
∫ min(lσ,z+δ′E/2)
max(−lσ,z−δ′
E
/2)
fZ′|X=x(s)ds
=
1
δ′E
[
Q
(
max(−lσ, z − δ′E2 )− x
σE
)
−Q
(
min(lσ, z +
δ′E
2 )− x
σE
)]
(3)
Hence, I(X ;Z) can be calculated by substituting (2) and (3)
in (1). Similarly, I(X ;Y ) can be calculated by substituting
Z with Y , σE with σB , and δ′E with δB (where δB is the
resolution of Bob’s A/D) in (1), (2), and (3). The achievable
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Fig. 5: Achievable secrecy rates versus the number of key bits
when Bob employs a 10-bit A/D and Eve employs A/D’s of
various quality. P = 1, l = 2.5, and the signal-to-noise ratio
of each of Eve’s channel and Bob’s channel is 30 dB.
secrecy rate can be found by substituting these expressions for
the mutual information into Rs = I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z).
In the case that the channel between Alice and Eve is
noiseless (e.g. Eve picks up the transmitter), I(X ;Z) can be
obtained from (1) through the evaluation of h(Z) and h(Z|X)
given that the channel noise is zero. h(Z) can be found by
setting σ2E = 0 in (2), and h(Z|X) can be obtained as,
h(Z|X) =
∫ ∞
−∞
h(Z|X = x)fX(x)dx
=
∫ ∞
−∞
h(X + nqE |X = x)fX(x)dx
=
∫ ∞
−∞
h(nqE)fX(x)dx = log(δ
′
E) (4)
Numerical results are presented in the next section.
B. Numerical Results
In this section, we first show that I(X ;Z) is maximized
when Eve sets the span of her A/D to avoid overflow, and
then we study the achievable secrecy rates of the proposed
method for various scenarios. In order to maximize the mutual
information (I(X ;Y ) or I(X ;Z)), we set the quantization
range by l = 2.5 [15]. Since I(X ;Z) is an intricate function
of the span of Eve’s A/D (m) and the number of key bits
employed per jamming symbol (k), we find the maximum of
this function numerically. In Figure 4, I(X ;Z) versus the span
of Eve’s A/D m and the number of key bits k when Eve
employs a bE = 20 bit A/D is shown. It can be seen that the
value of I(X ;Z) for various numbers of key bits per jamming
symbol is maximized when m = k. Thus, Eve will set the
dynamic range of her A/D to 2k+1lσ to avoid overflow.
In order to see how many cryptographic key bits per symbol
are needed to achieve secrecy, the curves of achievable secrecy
rates versus the number of key bits per jamming symbol, for
various qualities of Eve’s A/D, are shown in Figure 5. In this
figure, the transmitter power P = E[X2] = 1, which does not
include the jamming power (Note that we will consider a total
power constraint below in Figure 8). Although the quality of
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Bob’s channel, positive secrecy rates can be achieved.
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Fig. 7: Achievable secrecy rates versus signal-to-noise ratio of
Bob’s channel, for various numbers of key bits per jamming
symbol, when Eve’s channel is noiseless, i.e. Eve has perfect
access to what the transmitter sends and thus no other classical
technique is effective. P = 1, l = 2.5, and both Bob and Eve
use 10-bit A/Ds.
each of Bob’s and Eve’s channel is the same with a signal-
to-noise ratio of 30 dB, and thus the secrecy capacity of the
corresponding wiretap channel is zero, positive secrecy rates
are achieved through the proposed method. Further, even in the
case that Eve has an A/D of much better quality than Bob’s
A/D (or she has stacked multiple A/Ds of the same quality
as Bob’s A/D until limited by clock jitter), by utilizing more
key bits per jamming symbol, which are cheap cryptographic
bits and can be obtained at little cost [15], positive secrecy
rates (i.e. expensive information-theoretically secure bits) can
be obtained. The achievable secrecy rates versus the signal-
to-noise ratio of Eve’s channel (SNRE) for various numbers
of key bits per jamming symbol, when the SNR of Bob’s
channel is 60 dB, are depicted in Figure 6. It can be seen
that, even in disadvantaged environments where the quality
of Eve’s channel is better than the quality of Bob’s channel,
a positive secrecy rate can be achieved. In Figure 7, we
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symbol (k) for various values of the total SNR, when P+PJ =
1, Bob and Eve each have a 10-bit A/D, and the quality of
both channels is the same.
look at the extreme case that Eve is able to receive exactly
what Alice transmits (e.g. the adversary is able to pick up
the transmitter’s radio and hook directly to the antenna), but
the channel between Alice and Bob is noisy and hence no
other classical technique3 is effective. Finally, the secrecy rate
versus the number of key bits per jamming symbol (k) for a
total power constraint is shown in Figure 8. The total power
P + PJ = 1, Bob and Eve each have a 10-bit A/D, and
both channels have the same quality. When k = 0, there is
no jamming and all of the power is allocated to the signal;
thus, the secrecy rate is zero. As the number of key bits (and
hence the power allocated to the jamming signal) increases, the
secrecy rate increases, until eventually, as the power allocated
to the portion of the signal containing the message becomes
very small, it tapers at high jamming powers.
IV. WIDEBAND CHANNELS
When Alice and Bob have access to a wideband channel,
they can utilize frequency hopping based on a cryptographic
key to obtain information-theoretic secrecy. Frequency hop-
ping is a spread spectrum technique that divides the entire
available frequency band into sub-channels, such that at each
time instance the signal is being sent over one sub-channel
according to an entry in a pre-specified hopping pattern, which
is known only to Alice and Bob. Since the hopping pattern is
not known to the eavesdropper, she will lose anything outside
her receiver bandwidth, and thus this method can provide
protection against eavesdropping. However, an eavesdropper
with a wideband receiver can cover the entire frequency band.
Motivated by the results of Section III, we will consider adding
random jamming to the signal to prevent an eavesdropper with
a wide-band receiver from obtaining the message.
Suppose that Alice is sending a narrow-band signal with
bandwidth W in a (large) frequency band of span F by
employing a narrowband slot centered at a randomly chosen
center frequency fc. Since Bob knows the key, he can tune
3Quantum-cryptography techniques [25] are exempt from this.
his receiver to the correct frequency slot, while Eve is forced
to either expand the bandwidth of her receiver or risk missing
symbols.
Let ZB be the total additive noise, including both channel
and quantization noise, at Bob’s receiver and ZE be the total
additive noise at Eve’s receiver. In the case of band-limited
channels, since each of ZB and ZE is a superposition of a
Gaussian noise (channel) and a uniform noise (quantization),
the capacity of Bob’s channel and Eve’s channel cannot be
found directly. Fortunately, upper and lower bounds on the
capacity of a band-limited channel with independent additive
noise are available [26], [27]. For a channel with bandwidth
W , for a signal power of P and total additive noise Z with
power N , the capacity C lies between bounds,
W log
(
P +N
N
)
≤ C ≤W log
(
P +N
EZ
)
, (5)
where EZ is the entropy power of Z . Suppose Z is a super-
position of Gaussian noise G and uniform noise U . Since G
and U are zero-mean independent random variables,
N = E[Z2] = V ar(G) + V ar(U) = σ2 +
δ2
12
. (6)
The entropy power for a random variable Z is defined as,
EZ = 1
2pie
22h(Z),
where h(Z) is the differential entropy of Z . Here, the entropy
power of Z cannot be easily calculated. Hence, we use the
convolution inequality of entropy powers to find an upper
bound on EZ . The convolution inequality of entropy powers
states that the entropy power of the sum of two independent
random variables is greater than or equal to the sum of the
entropy powers of the summands [26], [28]. Thus,
EZ ≥ EG + EU
= V ar(G) +
6
pie
V ar(U)
= σ2 +
δ2
2pie
. (7)
From (5) and (6), the capacity of Bob’s channel can be lower
bounded as:
CB ≥W log
(
P +NB
NB
)
= W log
(
P + σ2B +
δ2B
12
σ2B +
δ2
B
12
)
. (8)
Now consider Eve’s receiver with bandwidth WE . If WE <
F , since Eve does not know the hopping pattern, she will
lose anything that is sent outside of the bandwidth that she is
currently monitoring, i.e. she can only obtain a fraction WEF
of the message. Using this fact and from (5), (6) and (7), an
upper bound for the capacity of Eve’s channel is:
CE ≤ WE
F
W log
(
P +NE
EZE
)
≤ WE
F
W log
(
P + σ2E +
δ2E
12
σ2E +
δ2
E
2pie
)
. (9)
Thus, from (8) and (9), a lower bound on the secrecy capacity
is:
Cs = CB − CE
≥W log
(
P + σ2B +
δ2B
12
σ2B +
δ2
B
12
)
− WEW
F
log
(
P + σ2E +
δ2E
12
σ2E +
δ2
E
2pie
)
.
(10)
Hence, any secrecy rate,
Rs =
[
W log
(
P + σ2B +
δ2B
12
σ2B +
δ2
B
12
)
−WEW
F
log
(
P + σ2E +
δ2E
12
σ2E +
δ2
E
2pie
)]+
, (11)
is achievable. The secrecy rate versus bandwidth and resolu-
tion of Eve’s receiver is shown in Figure 9. In this example,
both Bob and Eve have channels with SNR equal to 30 dB.
Bob has a 20-bit A/D, W = 100 kHz, and transmitter span
F = 100 MHz. In Figure 9(a) frequency hopping with a
10-bit key is employed, and it can be seen that by using
a wideband receiver and a high resolution A/D at Eve, the
secrecy rate is zero. In Figure 9(b), in addition to the frequency
hopping, a random jamming signal using a 20-bit key is added
to the signal, which helps the legitimate nodes to obtain a
positive secrecy rate (for this setting, the worst case rate of
2.736 bits/s/Hz is available), even when Eve uses a wideband
receiver and a high resolution A/D. However, in this case the
number of jamming bits needed to gain a non-zero secrecy
rate is large. Furthermore, if Eve uses a wideband receiver
with a very high resolution A/D, the secrecy capacity with a
20-bit A/D at Bob will be zero. In the next section, we will
see that speed-resolution limitations of A/Ds help us to obtain
non-zero secrecy rates with much fewer numbers of key bits
per jamming symbol, and in all feasible scenarios.
V. DISCUSSION
A limiting factor in the performance of A/Ds is aperture
jitter, which is the uncertainty in the sampling time of the
A/D. In order to better understand the relationship between
the aperture jitter of an A/D and its impact on an A/D’s
performance, let us consider the signal-to-noise-and-distortion
ratio (SNDR) of an A/D. The SNDR of an A/D is the ratio
of the root mean square (rms) of the amplitude of the input
signal to the rms sum of all other spectral components. The
signal-to-noise-and-distortion ratio due to the aperture jitter tj
when the input signal is sampled with frequency fin is [29]:
SNDRj = 20 log10
(
1
2pifintj
)
. (12)
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Fig. 9: Secrecy rate versus bandwidth and resolution of Eve’s
receiver: (a) frequency hopping, (b) frequency hopping with
a 20-bit random jamming signal. Both Bob and Eve have
channels of SNR equal to 30 dB. Bob has a 20-bit A/D, signal
bandwidth W = 100 kHz, and transmitter span F = 100
MHz. Without random jamming, the worst case secrecy rate
is zero, while with random jamming, a worst case secrecy rate
of 2.736 bits/s/Hz is achievable.
Hence, when other non-idealities (quantization noise, thermal
noise, etc.) of the A/D are not considered, (12) describes the
performance limit of an A/D due to the aperture jitter. The
sampling rate versus SNDR for trends in the current state-
of-the-art of A/Ds is shown in Figure 10. In this figure, the
performance envelope of (12) is shown by a solid red line for
tj = 1 ps, and a dashed red line for tj = 0.1 ps. It can be seen
that the best aperture jitter achieved by the current state-of-the
art of A/Ds is 0.1 ps.
The relationship between SNDR and effective number of
bits (ENOB) can be found by using the relationship between
SNDR and number of bits for an ideal A/D,
SNDR = 6.02 ENOB + 1.76 dB (13)
Thus, in Figure 10, with a change in the scaling of the
horizontal axis, SNDR is equivalent to ENOB.
From the numerical results at the end of the previous
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Fig. 10: Sampling frequency versus SNDR of published works
from 1997 to 2014. The red lines are jitter envelopes. The
solid line corresponds to 1 ps aperture jitter and the dashed
line corresponds to 0.1 ps aperture jitter (courtesy of [30]).
section, it seems that it is always possible for Eve to use a
wideband high-resolution A/D to compromise secrecy, in the
same way that a larger than envisioned memory at Eve would
compromise secrecy in the bounded memory model of [16],
[31]–[36]. However, from the discussion above, aperture jitter
is a critical limitation in the performance of A/Ds that prevents
Eve from increasing the bandwidth and resolution of her A/D
arbitrarily. In fact, aperture jitter restricts the product of the
sampling rate and the resolution of an A/D.
In Figure 11, the secrecy rate versus bandwidth and reso-
lution of Eve’s A/D, when a 10-bit random jamming signal
is added to the transmitted signal is shown. In this figure,
both Bob and Eve have channels with an SNR of 30 dB. Bob
has a 20-bit A/D, a signal bandwidth W = 100 kHz, and a
transmitter span of F = 100 MHz. The gray plane in this
figure is the current technology jitter envelope. Assuming that
the eavesdropper has access to the best A/D with current tech-
nology, the bandwidth-resolutions she can utilize are restricted
to this jitter envelope, and anything beyond this envelope is
not feasible. Hence, the minimum secrecy rate in this case is
4.25 bit/s/Hz. This shows that, in practice, much fewer key bits
per jamming symbol are needed compared to Figure 9(b), and,
for current technology (0.1 ps jitter), the eavesdropper cannot
compromise secrecy by employing a better A/D. Clearly, in
this case either the aperture jitter of the eavesdropper’s A/D
should be known to legitimate nodes, or they should assume
that the eavesdropper has access to the best current technology.
A. Aperture jitter evolution and its ultimate limit
The best aperture jitter for A/Ds has changed from 100
ps in the 1980s to 0.1 ps in the current state of the art.
This improvement of the jitter might seem unfavorable to
our proposed method, as we rely on the non-ideality of the
eavesdropper’s A/D. Thus, if the jitter improves with the
same slope, unbounded over time, it can destroy the ability
dent Version of MATLAB
Fig. 11: Secrecy rate versus bandwidth and resolution of Eve’s
receiver, when a 10-bit random jamming signal is added to
the transmitted signal. Both Bob and Eve have channels with
SNR of 30 dB. Bob has a 20-bit A/D, W = 100 kHz, and
transmitter bandwidth F = 100 MHz. The gray plane is the
current technology jitter envelope (0.1 ps). The bandwidth-
resolutions on the right side of the gray plane are not feasible
by the current technology, and thus a worst case secrecy rate
of 4.25 bits/s/Hz is available.
to transmit messages with the proposed method at some point
in the future. However, the trend of A/D jitter shows that the
current state of the art was achieved in 2005, and has not
changed significantly since that time. This, along with the fact
that the technology scaling has changed dramatically since
2005, suggests that the performance of A/D aperture jitter
is already in a state of saturation [30], [37]. Nevertheless,
it is possible that the aperture jitter improves over time.
Fortunately, there exists an ultimate limit on the ability to
store an accurate reconstruction of an analog signal due to the
Heisenberg uncertainty principle [19]–[21].
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have introduced a method to convert
ephemeral “cheap” cryptographic key bits to “expensive”
information-theoretically secure bits to achieve everlasting
security in wireless environments where the intended recipient
Bob is at a disadvantage relative to the eavesdropper Eve.
A random jamming signal chosen from a discrete uniform
random ensemble based on a key pre-shared between the
transmitter Alice and Bob is added to each transmitted symbol.
The intended receiver uses the key sequence to subtract the
jamming signal, while the eavesdropper Eve, in order to
prevent overflows of her analog-to-digital (A/D) converter,
needs to enlarge her A/D span and thus degrade the resolution
of her A/D, thus resulting in information loss even if Eve
is handed the key at the conclusion of transmission and is
able to modify her recorded signal to attempt to remove the
jamming effect. The numerical results show that this method
can provide secrecy even in the case that the eavesdropper has
perfect access to the output of the transmitter’s radio and an
A/D of much better quality than that of the intended receiver.
We have also considered the case when the legitimate nodes
and the eavesdropper have access to wideband channels. When
the channel bandwidth is larger than the signal bandwidth, the
legitimate nodes can use their cryptographic key bits to try
to hide the location of the signal from Eve by employing
a frequency hopping technique. With this extra degree of
freedom, since the product of the bandwidth and the resolution
of an A/D is limited by its aperture jitter, Eve will be forced
to make an additional tradeoff between A/D resolution and
sampling frequency. Hence, the strategy of system nodes is
to use frequency hopping in conjunction with the additive
random jamming method. Eve must choose to either use a high
resolution A/D with small bandwidth and thus lose anything
outside her bandwidth, or use a wideband A/D with low
resolution and thus be susceptible to the random jamming
signal. Technology trend lines and fundamental limits for A/Ds
indicate this will pose a significant challenge to Eve.
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